University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

Winter 1982

Fiduciary's Investment Duty - The Peril of the
Prudent Man Rule
J. Rodney Johnson
University of Richmond, rjohnson@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
J. Rodney Johnson, Fiduciary's Investment Duty - The Peril of the Prudent Man Rule, Va. B. Ass'n J., Winter 1982, at 12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

J.

RODNEY JOHNSON

A Fiduciary's Investment Duty-The Peril
of The "Prudent Man Rule"
THE purpose of this article is ( 1) to report on the
recent decision in Hoffman v. First Virginia Bank, 1 (2)
to identify the several problems this decision has
created for the public and for the bar, (3) to propose a
statutory solution to these problems, and (4) to suggest
an interim approach to these problems that draftsmen
of wills and trusts might take while awaiting the passage of an appropriate statute.

The Facts
Complainants alleged that, pursuant to decedent's
will, a marital trust was established on August 15, 1972,
with assets valued at approximately $104,000; that
between December 7, 1972 and January 4, 1973, approximately $40,000 of these assets (38'fo of the trust's corpus)
were sold and the proceeds were invested in securities of
three REITs (real estate investment trusts); that the
securities of all REITs declined in value during the next
seven months, until September, 1973, at which time
they "plummeted"; and that the market for such securities had "substantially collapsed" by the end of 1973, in
consequence of which the trust's REIT securities became "substantially worthless." Complainants further
alleged that the trustee committed various acts of negligence in making and maintaining these investments.
The trustee demurred, contending that the acts complained of were authorized by the language of decedent's will.

The Issue
"In this appeal, the principal question is whether a
testator, in providing for a testamentary marital trust,
waived the 'prudent man rule' otherwise applicable in
the investment of trust assets." 2

The Holding
The Court recognizes that a Virginia fiduciary, in the
performance of its investment duties, may rely upon the
legal list contained in Code Sections 26-40 and 26-40.1,
which expressly state that certain enumerated securities
are "legal investments"; or the fiduciary may elect to
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invest pursuant to the much broader "prudent man
rule" which, as codified in Section 26-45.1, reads in part
as follows:
... in acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling and managing
property for the benefit of another, an executor, administrator, trustee or other fiduciary,
both individual and corporate, shall exercise
the judgment of care under the circumstances
then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income as well as the probable safety
of their capital. Within the limitations of the
foregoing standard, an executor, adminstrator, trustee or other fiduciary, both individual
and corporate, is authorized to acquire and
retain every kind of property, real, personal or
mixed, and every kind of investment, specifically including but not by way of limitation,
debentures and other corporate obligations
and stocks, preferred or common, and securities of any open-end or closed-end management type investment company or investment
trust registered under the Federal Investment
Company Act of 1940, as from time to time
amended, which men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence acquire or retain for their
own account ...
The Court also notes the complainant's concess10n
that the "prudent man rule" may be waived by a testator, adds, that "[a]lthough there was no express waiver
(in this will), a waiver may arise by necessary implication from the language used in the will," and then the
Court proceeds to its conclusion on this point in the
following language:
In Article V, the testator gave his executor
and trustee "full discretionary powers of management ... without being restricted to those
investments authorized by statute in Virginia
for the investment of trust funds .... " This
provision authorized the fiduciary to invest in

assets other than those specifically listed in
Code §§ 26-40 and 26-40.1.
The testator was especially interested in giving his executor and trustee power to retain
any or all of his investments, and he exonerated the fiduciary, acting in either capacity,
from liability for depreciation in the value of
securities so retained. This provision was
important to afford flexibility in protecting
the testator's interests in the closely-held, family corporations listed in the inventory of his
estate.
The powers of the trustee alone were then
stated. The will authorized investment "in
any type of real or personal property ...
regardless of diversification or State laws, and
... in common stock, unimproved real estate,
non-productive items, common trust funds,
investment company shares .... " This language, the Trustee maintains, gave it the
broadest possible investment authority and
waived the application of the "prudent man
rule." We agree.
Having already provided that the executor
and trustee could invest without being restricted to the list of legal investments under
Code§§ 26-40 and 26-40.1, (emphasis added)
the testator clearly intended to grant more
comprehensive powers to the trustee alone.
Accordingly, he specifically waived any requirement of diversification of investments,
and then removed any further restrictions
upon the trustee's investment powers by eliminating the constraints of laws otherwise
applicable. We cannot agree with the contention of the beneficiaries that the testator
intended by these provisions only to reaffirm
his waiver of the "legal list" of investments set
forth in Code§§ 26-40 and 26-40.1. The terminology is too broad to be construed as applying to a single investment law, embraced
within the two statutes, that h.ad already been
eliminated. The language is clear and unambiguous, so that no extrinsic evidence is
admissible to explain its meaning. We conclude that the testator's language must be
construed as a waiver of the "prudent man
rule" that had been incorporated into the statute law of the Commonwealth. 3
Comment on the Decision

There are two separate and distinct investment questions regularly encountered in fiduciary administration. One question is posed at a very early stage as the
fiduciary asks "Which of the investments that the decedent made during his lifetime, and which were passed
to me by reason of his death, may I properly retain?" 4 In
addition to this question, the fiduciary must ask itself
throughout the term of its administration "What
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investments are proper for me to make as an original
matter?" 5 As the fiduciary is faced with these two separate investment questions it is customary to also deal
separately with the fiduciary's powers concerning these
questions. An examination of the form-books furnished to the bar by five Richmond banks discloses that
all of them deal separately with the power to retain and
the power to invest. Indeed, the statutory "boiler-plate"
furnished to the entire State bar by the General Assembly in Code 64.1-57 6 provides separately for these separate aspects of the overall investment responsibility of a
fiduciary.
The major premise in the foregoing decision (see the
italicized language) is that because the testator, by his
prior language, had already eliminated the legal list as a
restriction upon the trustee's power to invest, the necessary result of the testator's latter language was to waive
the "prudent man rule" as a restriction upon the trustee's power to invest. It is respectfully submitted that the
decision is incorrect at this point. Instead, it is believed
13

that the prior language (which is found in context at
220 Va. 837, in paragraph 3; and at 263 S.E. 2d 405, in
paragraph I) merely states the fiduciaries' powers to
retain investments made by the decedent during his
lifetime, and leaves the matter of the trustee's own original investments to be dealt with by the latter language. 7
If this writer's conclusion concerning the prior language is correct then, of course, the Court's basis for its
conclusion that the latter language necessarily waived
the "prudent man rule" is incorrect and so also is the
holding of the case. In all fairness to the Court, however, it must be noted that the distinction between "retention" and "investment" powers was not presented to
the Court by complaints.

The Problems Created
Whether the foregoing analysis is correct or not, it is
submitted that the Hoffman decision has definitely
generated great confusion concerning the present applicability of the "prudent man rule" to Virginia trusts
that contain standard "boiler-plate" investment provisions. The form-books referred to earlier in this article
all contain provisions granting additional discretionary investment powers upon the trustee. To what
extent, if any, do these provisions result in an implied
waiver of the "prudent man rule"? The Hoffman opinion also states that
... the express authorization to invest in
nonproductive items and unimproved real
estate shows an intent to permit the fiduciary
in its discretion to invest in speculations. 8
It is submitted that this is not necessarily true, as a
matter of law, and it is typically wrong as a matter of
fact. From a legal standpoint the rule is that "[t]he
provisions of the trust instrument are ordinarily strictly
construed against an enlargement of the scope of permissible investments beyond those allowed under the
('prudent man rule')," 9 and the language in question is
dearly capable of a construction other than an intent to
permit speculations. From a factual standpoint, it
borders on the incredible to believe that the typical
testator actually intends to enable his trustee to speculate, i.e. to gamble with the trust fund at the beneficiary's expense, absent specific language to that end.
Indeed, the primary purpose of most persons in creating trust funds for the benefit of another is to insure
that the beneficiary will receive either a certain income
or else will receive whatever amount may be necessary
to insure the beneficiary's support. This intent is
totally inconsistent with an intent to allow the trustee
to gamble with the corpus that the beneficiary's income
14

or support is dependent upon. Yet, in the light of
Hoffman, standard "boiler-plate" administrative provisions are capable of being construed as impliedly
waiving the "prudent man rule."
Moreover it is believed that if a testator, after reading
through all of the "boiler-plate" contained in his trust
(a dubious assumption, perhaps, considering the technical nature of the language regularly used therein and
the length that runs to 214 lines in the statutory version) should ask the drafting attorney what it all
means, he probably would not receive a detailed explanation but instead would receive a short, tranquillizing
statement to the effect that "It is just standard, form
language that the bank likes to have to enable it to do its
job more efficiently, certainly nothing to be concerned
about, merely provisions that provide for flexibility in
administration in the future as times and circumstances change in order to enable the trustee to better
carry out your wishes, etc."
In addition to not conforming to the desires and
expectations of the consumer, and the assurances of the
draftsman, this implied waiver of the "prudent man
rule" may also create a tax problem for a decedent's
estate. One of the purposes of the testator in creating a
"marital" trust in Hoffman presumably was to obtain
for his estate the benefit of the federal estate tax marital
deduction. Yet, if the IRS should agree with the Court's
conclusion concerning the trustee's powers, the testator's estate would be denied the benefit of this deduction. The basic rationale of the federal government is
that the allowance of the marital deduction where a
spouse is given a life income right and a general power
of appointment is based on the assumption that there
will, in fact, be a "right" to income for life. The unfettered power of a trustee to eliminate such an income
through the selection of permissible investments is
quite inconsistent with the beneficiary having a "right
to income," and thus the marital deduction is not
allowable where the trustee has such a power. 10 Of
course the federal tax audit in the present case was
concluded long before the present litigation was begun.
But what about those estates that will pass through
federal estate tax proceedings in the future? What will
be the decision concerning the allowability of the federal estate tax marital deduction if the trust contains
investment provisions such as the following:
(c) To invest and reinvest all of the funds of
the estate as said fiduciary, in his sole discretion, may deem best, including investment in
stocks, common and preferred, and common
trust funds, without being restricted to those
investments expressly approved by statute for

investment by fiduciaries; and to change investments from realty to personalty, and vice
versa.
(cl) To invest and reinvest all of the funds
of the estate as said fiduciary, in his sole discretion, may deem best, including investment in
interests in investment trusts and mutual
funds, without being restricted to those investments expressly approved by statute for
investment by fiduciaries; and to change
investments from realty to personalty, and
vice versa. 11
It was formerly thought that the foregoing language,
taken from the statutory "boiler-plate," might be
immune from such an attack, even by a zealous IRS
agent. In the wake of Hoffman, however, one must
anticipate the very real possibility of IRS taking the
position that all such broadly worded investment powers will result in the implied waiver of the "prudent
man rule," and thus in the denial of the federal estate
tax marital deduction. One can almost hear the agent
saying, "Well, the language in '(c)' authorizes the trustee to depart from the legal list, therefore having already
eliminated the legal list by the language in paragraph
(c), the language in (cl) must logically manifest an
intent to grant more comprehensive powers to the trustee by impliedly waiving the 'prudent man rule'." Of
course any agent who comes to such an absurd conclusion could be proven wrong by reference to the statutory
history of these two "boiler-plate" powers. However,
this ability to prove the agent wrong will be of little
comfort (i) to those who are unaware of the remedy, (ii)
to those who will find it less costly to suffer the unwarranted loss of the marital deduction than to litigate in
order to obtain it, and (iii) to those who must ultimately
bear the cost of educating the Service concerning this
aspect of Virginia law. Lastly, even if one is unconcerned about the foregoing statutory "boiler-plate,"
what about the "boiler-plate" contained in the formbooks furnished to the bar by corporate fiduciaries,
which typically contain broader investment provisions as a part of their "boiler-plate"?
A Permanent Solution
A somewhat similar problem, i.e. unintended extension of an administrative provision, was presented to
estate planners by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The
problem then was the possibility that a standard direction to one's executor to pay all death taxes from the
residue of one's estate without apportionment might be
construed as also applying to a "generation skipping
transfer tax" under IRC § 2601. In order to prevent this
unintentional, though literal, construction of a rather

standard administrative provision, the General Assembly enacted the following statute:
A general direction in a will to pay all taxes
imposed on account of a testator's death or
similar language shall not be construed to
include taxes imposed on a "generation skipping transfer" under § 2601 of the Internal
Revenue Code or taxes imposed upon the estate of a prior decedent in which the testator
had no power of appointment or similar
power of disposition, unless the testator shall
expressly manifest an intention that such
taxes be paid out of his estate by reference to§
2601 of the Internal Revenue Code or otherwise.12
It is believed that a similar statute would be the
simplest and best solution to the present problem. Such
a provision, which would logically be added to the end
of Section 26-45. l, might read as follows:
(e) A general authorization in a will or trust
authorizing a fiduciary to invest in such assets
as the fiduciary, in his sole discretion, may
deem best, or other language purporting to
expand the fiduciary's in~estment powers,
shall not be construed to waive the rule of
paragraph (a) hereof unless the testator or settlor shall expressly manifest an intention that
it be waived (i) by reference to the "prudent
man rule," (ii) by reference to the power of the
fiduciary to make "speculative" investments,
or (iii) by other language synonymous with (i)
or (ii) immediately preceding.
Not only is it important that the General Assembly
codify this rule in Virginia, it is also important that the
General Assembly establish that the "prudent man
rule" has always been the proper rule of decision in
Virginia (absent specific language to the contrary),
notwithstanding the abberational holding in Hoffman.
Accordingly, in order to establish the foregoing and to
insure that Hoffman is confined to its unique facts, it is
further submitted that the bill introducing the abovesuggested statute should also contain a statement that
"The provisions of this act are declaratory of existing
law." Such was the course taken by the General Assembly in 1978 when Section 64.l-74(d) was added to the
Code 13 in order to prevent an unintended extension of
the rule against perpetuities, and it is believed that the
clarification is equally if not more important in the
instant case. 14
An Interim Solution
Earlier in this article it was suggested that the typical
draftsman might give a tranquillizing response if queried concerning the "boiler-plate" administrative pro15

visions in a will or trust. It is also believed that quite
often the client doesn't even bother to ask about the
effect of such language because it is recognized that this
is the lawyer's part of the document (as opposed to the
dispositive portion of the document) and the client
alternatively doesn't know to ask, is for some reason
reticent, or simply trusts the lawyer to do what is in the
client's best interest. What attorney hasn't, on numerous occasions, heard "Well, I don't know what all that
legal mumbo-jumbo means, but if you say its what I
want I'll sign it." And, of course, when the draftsman
incorporates the statutory "boiler-plate" by reference,
the client typically doesn't even see the language in
question. In the aftermath of Hoffman, is there an
added responsibility of an estate planner to his client
viv-a-vis administrative provisions? It is submitted that
if an attorney prepares a will or trust containing
"boiler-plate" that might be construed to impliedly
waive the "prudent man rule," and thereby enable a
trustee to speculate at the beneficiary's expense, as well
as to endanger the allowance of the marital deduction
without advising the client of these consequences, he is
failing to carry out his own fiduciary duty to that client.
Therefore it is suggested that, until this matter is
resolved by an appropriate statute, the prudent attorney
may wish to (1) have a letter in the files of all future
clients stating that they understand these risks and wish
to take them, or else (2) add appropriate limiting language to the administrative powers, such as, for
example:
Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a waiver of the "prudent man rule"
contained in Section 26-45. l(a) of the Code of
Virginia as it is written on the date of this will.
Conclusion
Regardless of the correctness of the decision in Hoffman, the present uncertainty concerning the applicability of the "prudent man rule" in Virginia when the
governing document contains "boiler-plate" invest-
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ment powers is intolerable. It is imperative that the
General Assembly end this uncertainty with an appropriate statute. Pending the passage of such a statute, the
prudent draftsman may well wish to consider including
appropriate limiting language in his wills and trusts.
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